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The Federal Reserve Bank has the ability to change themoney supply and to shape the
expectations of market participants through their open market operations. These operationsmay
amount to 20% of the day's volume and are concentrated during the half hour knownas 'Fed
Time'. Using previously unavailable data on open market operations, ourpaper provides the first
comprehensive examination of the impact of the Federal Reserve Bank's trading on both fixed
income instruments and foreign currencies. Our results detail a dramatic increase involatility
during Fed Time. Surprisingly, the Fed Time volatility is higher on days whenopen market
operations are absent. In addition, little systematic differences in market impact arc observed for
reserve-draining versus reserve-adding operations. These results suggest that the financial
markets correctly anticipate the purpose of open market operations but are unable to forecast the
timing of the operations.
Campbell R. Harvey Roger D. Huang
The Fuqua School of Business Department of Economics
Duke University Vanderbilt University
Durham, NC 27706 Box 1819, Station B
and NBER Nashville, TN 372351. Introduction
The goal of this paper is to investigate the impact of the Federal ReserveBank's
open market operations on the financial markets. These operations typically in-
volve the purchase or sale of Treasury securities and canrepresent a substantial
amount of any day's trading volume. Using new daily data on theoperations, we
are able to assess the impact on eight different financial markets: Treasurybill,
Eurodollar, Treasury bond, and five U.S. dollar exchange rates.
The Federal Reserve Bank can be viewed as a trader with private information.
This information is revealed to the market inmany different ways: remarks by
the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, testimony before the House andSenate
Banking Committees, the release of the Beige book, the minutes of the Federal
Open Market Committee meetings, changes in reserve requirements, changes in
the discount rate, and open market operations. The last methodis, by far, the
primary and most actively employed policy tool of the Federal Reserve Bank
in implementing its monetary policy. Therefore, our analysis providesa rare
opportunity to study the effects of private information trading. Data on private
trades are often unavailable and the identity of the informed traders is seldom
known. In contrast, we are able to identify a major market participant with
private information. We know the time of the day when this participant trades.
We know the volume and the type of trade. With this information,we are in
a position to assess the impact of the Federal Reserve Bank's operations on a
number of important markets.'
Our analysis reveals that the Federal Reserve Bank'sopen market operations
result in dramatic increases in volatility during the trading-time window, 11:30am—
12:00 EST, known as 'Fed Time'. However, the elevated volatilities are surprisingly
more pronounced on days when there are no open market operations. We also
examine the effects on the returns and the volatilities of specific operations that
are designed to increase or decrease money supply. Contrary to expectations,
Formal models of market microstructure with privately informed traders are
provided by Kyle (1985), Admati and Pfieiderer (1988), Foster and Viswanathan
(1990), and others.
1the effects on returns of reserve-adding and reserve-draining operations cannot be
reliably differentiated from one another. These results suggest that the market
participants correctly forecast whether the Federal Reserve Bank intends to add
or to drain reserves. However, the market participants are unable to anticipate
the specific days when open market operations are conducted.
The importance of information about the Federal Reserve Bank's intentions is
highlighted by a recent incident. On February 4, 1994, the Federal Reserve Bank's
Chairman Greenspan made the unusual move of announcing the Fed intentions
to "tighten" one half-hour before Fed Time. This is the first "tightening" since
February 1989. The action caused prices in the fixed income markets to plummet.
The Fed's New York desk calmed the market by trading a $1.5 billion dollar
customer repurchase agreement which is a reserve-adding operation during Fed
Time. The Chairman's experiment has added new impetus to thosetrying to
understand the role of the Fed in the country's economic strategy, thespecific
actions available to the Fed as well as the impact of these actions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the secondsection, we
describe the mechanisms through which the Federal Reserve Bank'sopen market
operations affect financial markets. In this section, we detail the type ofopen
market operations that are available to the Federal Reserve Bank and theexpected
effect of each operation. The data sources and the econometricmethodology are
outlined in the third section. In the fourth section, the resultsare presented.
Some concluding remarks are offered in the final section.
2.The Federal Reserve Bank'sopen market operations
2.1. Policy and implementation
Much has been written about the role of the Federal Reserve Bank in the
economy. By exercising some control over the money supply, most believe that
the Federal Reserve Bank has the ability to influence financialprices, in particular,
the short-term interest rates. Thispaper aims to provide direct evidence on the
2impact of open market operations on financial markets.
Before examining the specific actions that the Federal Reserve Banktakes,
we first describe how policies are translated into actions.2 At the highest level, the
Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 mandates that the Federal
Reserve Bank set annual growth targets for monetary aggregates andjustify these
targets with respect to economic activity, inflation policy and employment outlook.
As a result of this act, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bankappears before
the House and Senate Banking committees twice ayear to explain the Federal
Reserve Bank Policy (known as the Humphrey-Hawkins hearings).
Of course, the testimony of the Chairman is based on policy and activities
that has been preformulated. The body in charge of policy is the FederalOpen
Market Committee (FOMC). This committee meets about eight times ayear and
consists of the presidents of the Federal Reserve Bank districts and the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank in Washington.
Over the past 20 years, several approaches have been followed to achieve
the monetary objectives. For example, on October 6, 1979 the Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Bank announced a policy shift to one that targeted reserves and
deemphasized control of interest rates.3 Subsequently, the economy fell into a
sharp recession and interest rates rose to historic levels. This led to the adoption
of a new approach at the October 1982 meeting of the FOMC. After October 1982,
Ml targeting was basically abandoned. In addition, the type of reserve targeting
was altered (and will be described in detail later). Since these regime changes
may confound the analysis of the Federal Reserve Bank's open market operations,
our sample is confined to the post-October 1982 period.
Monetary policy can be implemented in a number of ways. The main options
available to the Federal Reserve Bank are changes in required reserves, changes in
the discount rate, and open market operations. The first two are drastic actions
that are rarely implemented. The main vehicle of monetary policy is the open
2Ourdiscussion draws from the detailed reviews of the Federal Reserve Bank
provided by Broaddus (1988) and especially by Meulendyke (1989).
See the Federal Reserve Bulletin, December 1979.
3market operations.
To understand the impact of the open market operations,we must understand
the relation between the operations and the reserve measures. Since October1982,
the Federal Reserve Bank targets the broadaggregates M2 and M3 by control-
ling the amount of borrowing from the Federal Reserve that banks undertaketo
maintain their reserve requirements.
The demand for reserves has two main components:required reserves (RR)
and excess reserves (ER). Reserves required on transactionsaccounts range from
0% to 12% of the balances. Banks must keepenough reserves to meet these
requirements on average over every two week maintenance period which endsevery
other Wednesday.4 Banks may also keep ER with the FederalReserve Bank. Since
the reserves at the Federal Reserve Bank providea means for interbank transfers,
it is not unusual for a bank's reserves to turnover 25 timesa day. At the end of
the day, the bank must coverany deficit. One means of doing this is to borrow
from another bank with a surplus. Thisborrowing is done at the federal funds
rate.
The supply of reserves has two categories: borrowedreserves (BR) and non-
borrowed reserves (NBR). There are threetypes of BR which are available to
banks through the Fed's discount window:adjustment credit, seasonal credit, and
extended credit borrowing. The first twoare reasonably common and the last
category is only used if the bank is in trouble. More importantly, banksmust
try to obtain reserves from other means, such as the federal fundsmarket, before
using the discount window.
Nonborrowed reserves are obtained fromsources that exclude the discount
window. During the 1979-1982regime, the Federal Reserve Bank attempted to
control NBR in order to achieve theirobjectives for the growth in aggregates.
Given an NBR target, a change in demand forreserves by banks had to be accom-
modated at the discount window. Thisborrowing heavily influenced the market
for federal funds and producedlarge fluctuations in short-term interest rates. Since
October 1982, the Federal Reserve Banksets a level of borrowing that it believes
Before 1984, maintenance periodswere one week long (Meulendyke (1988)).
4is consistent with the goals for the monetary aggregates. Variation in institutions'
demands for reserves are then accomplished through the open market operations.
These NBR are primarily provided by the purchase of Treasury securities by the
trading desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Before detailing the specific operations, consider an example of how policy
is implemented. Suppose the FOMC, concerned with heightened inflation, elects
to increase reserve "pressure." The appropriate action is to drain reserves. An
example of a draining operation is the New York desk selling Treasury securities.
The immediate impact is the loss of reserves in the purchasers' banks. As the
purchasers' banks try to make up the deficiency, all banks are affected. The pur-
chasers' banks have a number of options: they could reduce transactions deposits
(which would serve the policy objective but is difficult to implement in the short
run), they could reduce their excess reserves (but they may not have any), or they
could go to the federal funds market (which would bid up the federal funds rate).
For the banking industry as a whole, going to the federal funds market would
merely redistribute the shortage. In fact, borrowing reserves at the discount win-
dow may be the only possibility. This process leads to a gradual decline in the
money growth.
2.2. Instruments of open-market operations
Open market operations involve the purchase or sale of Treasury securities. Sales
drain reserves (increase reserve pressure) and purchases add to reserves (decrease
reserve pressure). The trades can be permanent or temporary.
The Federal Reserve Bank permanently changes the reserve pressure by its
outright sales and purchases. These outright operations could involve Treasury
bilis or bonds. They are usually large operations and it is not unusual for the
operation to account for 10-20% of the day's trading volume.5 By way of compar-
ison, these operations may involve daily doll.r volumes greater than the value of
There are also outrights that are executed for foreign accounts. While we
also have data on these foreign outrights, we exclude them from our analysis since
they are of a much smaller size and are unlikely to influence the market.
5stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
The Federal Reserve Bank could add reserves temporarily with a systemre-
purchase agreement (RP). Suppose that there is a forecast of a temporary shortage
of NBR. The Federal Reserve Bank could execute an outright purchase of Trea-
sury securities but the purchase would have to be reversed because the shortage of
NBR is expected to be temporary. The RP provides a more efficientway to meet
the policy objective since it obligates the primary dealers to return cash plus in-
terest (at the repo rate) and to reacquire the security. In contrast to the outright,
the list of eligible collateral for the RP is much more extensive. As a result, the
average system RPs are much larger than the average outright purchases.
There are also customer-related repurchase agreements. A number offoreign
institutions place some of their dollar holdings in the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York's daily RP facility. These could be handled internallyor passed to
the market as a customer RP. The customer RP is onaverage smaller than the
system RP and almost always has a one-day duration. Executing a customer RP
is supposed to signal to the market that the reserve need is smalland/or uncertain
and of very short-term duration. Executing a system RPsuggests that the reserve
need is larger and longer lasting.
The opposite of the RP is the matched-sale purchase (MSP). Thisoperation
involves the desk selling Treasury bills from thesystem account for immediate
delivery and, at the same time, agreeing to buy them back for delivery on a future
date. This operation is designed to temporarily drainreserves.
2.3. The process of an open market trade
This section explores how the tools ofopen market operations are used on a day-
by-day basis. The directives of the FOMC are carried out in the context of two-
week maintenance periods. The Manager of the SystemOpen Market Account
is charged with achieving those objectives via thedaily operations. The daily
routine of the open market desk involves fivesteps as described in Meulendyke
(1988).
6The first step is to gather information. Most macroeconomic news is released
at 8:30am EST. Following the news releases, the desk telephones primary govern-
ment security dealers and some large banks. The dealers tell the desk how they
expect the day to proceed and how they will finance their securities positions. The
large banks inform the desk about their reserve needs. In addition, there are three
or four 15-minute meetings with a small groups of dealers. The dealers provide
information as to where they (and their clients) think rates are going. Some of the
dealers are associated with large banks and they may reveal information about
the strength of business loan demand and financing needs. While all this is going
on, forecasters at the research departments of the New York Federal Reserve Bank
and the Board of Governors gather data to provide forecasts of reserves.
The second step is the telephone call to the Treasury concerning its forecast
of its balance for the day at about 10:30am. By this time, the research department
of the New York Federal Reserve Bank has a preliminary forecast of the size of
NBR over the maintenance period in the absence of any open market operations.
This estimate is made more precise using the information from the call to the
Treasury.
The third step is to formulate the actions for the day. With the Treasury
data, the forecasts for NBR are updated and interventions are formulated. The
forecasts from the New York Federal Reserve Bank and the Board of Governors
are combined and the trading plan is formulated.
The fourth step is a conference call at 11:15am. This conference call links
the Manager (and staff) to the Director of the Division of Monetary Affairs at
the Board of Governors and to one of the Federal Reserve Bank presidents that
also sits on the FOMC. The call usually lasts 15-20 minutes. The call reviews the
information gathered and the views on where rates are going. At the end of the
call, the proposed actions for the day are detailed.
The fifth step is execution. After the meeting is over (usually between
11:30am and 11:40am), the desk traders immediately contact the primary dealers
and execute the day's program.
73. Data and methodology
3.1.Data
Dataon the Federal Reserve Bank's daily open market operations were pro-
vided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The tables have 10 columns of
data for each day.6 The data include outright purchases and sales (classified by
bill or coupon), system MSPs, and system RPs as well as redemptions of bills,
coupons or agency issues. The duration of MSPs and the RPs are also provided.
The data also include the purchase and the sales of foreign bills (which are ex-
ecuted away from the market) as well as MSPs which are arranged for foreign
customers. Our analysis will concentrate on five categories: outright purchases,
outright sales, MSPs, system RPs, and customer RPs.
To assess the effect of the operations on the financial markets, we use intraday
price data from the futures markets. Our analysis includes Treasury bond futures
(from the Chicago Board of Trade) and two money market instruments: Treasury
bill and Eurodollar futures (both from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange). One of
the main difficulties with fixed income instruments is the lack of homogeneity. A
90-day Treasury bill becomes an 89-day bill the following day. The volatility of a
discount instrument usually decreases as time to maturity shortens. In addition,
the market for off-the-run issues may be illiquid and transactions dataare difficult
to obtain. However, with the advent of futures trading, it is possible to study, ina
highly liquid market, volatility patterns of fixed income instruments while holding
time to maturity constant. In addition, we use data on five U.S. dollarcurrency
futures from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange: Canadian dollar,Deutschemark,
French franc, Japanese yen, and Swiss franc. While thereare a whole host of
foreign exchange interventions initiated by the Fed, we concentrate on the possible
spillover of the interest rate-related operations to thecurrency markets.
6 Hardcopies ofthese tables were provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. For 1987 and 1988, somecomputer worksheets (where the hardcopies had
been loaded) were also provided. However,we found discrepancies between the
worksheets and the hardcopies and, as a result, did notuse the worksheets.
83.2. Methodology
This paper uses transaction prices from the futures markets to study the
impact of open market operations. The returns are the natural logarithm of the
current price divided by the previous price. We estimate the volatility of hourly
returns but focus on intrahour volatility using two-minute returns. This is because
the variance of hourly returns may not pick up the volatility that occurs within
the hour since only two points are used to calculate the hourly return and frequent
information arrival may occur within the hour. We calculate the volatility of two-
minute returns for four half-hour intervals: 1O:OOam—1O:3Oam, 1O:3Oam—11:OOam,
11:OOam—11:3Oam, and 11:3Oam—12:OOpm (Fed Time). We also average the daily
variances during Fed Time to obtain annual estimates.
We use heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of variances to test





where rt represents a vector of returns over, for example, four half-hour intervals,
j.i is a vector of mean returns over the time intervals, cr2 is a vector of variances,
and Ut and et are the disturbance terms.
With four time intervals, there are 8 equations in (1) and 8 parameters.
These parameters could be estimated with maximum likelihood. However, the
standard errors would not be robust to conditional heteroskedasticity. There-
fore, we use Hansen's (1982) generalized method of moments (GMM) to obtain
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of the variances and to conduct hy-
pothesis tests on the parameters. The model is exactly identified when we condi-
tion on a vector of ones. One advantage of Hansen's approach is that only weak
distributional assumptions are required.7
With the GMM methodology, it is straightforward to test the hypothesis that
variances are different during a particular time period. For example, variance
''Otherstudies that usethesevariance estimators include Richardson and
Smith (1991),Harvey and Huang (1991, 1993) and Ronen (1993).
9equality can be tested with:
Ut =rt—p
et= (r — p)2—a2 (2)
where a2 is a singleton parameter and tisa 1 x 4 vector of ones. This system is
overidentified resulting in a x2testwith three degrees of freedom. Alternatively,
Wald tests of parameter restrictions can be carried out on (1).
We also test for the effects of the open market operations on both the returns
and the volatilities. This analysis is specialized to the Fed Time half-hour interval,
denoted with the FT subscript. The following model is estimated:
19886









where jrepresentsthe type of operation (outright purchase, outright sale,
matched-sale purchase, system RP, customer RP, and no operation), y represents
the year, 10M0 is an indicator variable for the open market operations. In this
formulation, rFT,t is a 15 x 1 vector of two-minute returns in Fed Time for time
period t. U'T, and eFT,t are the disturbance terms associated with the mean
and variance equations. The parameters p and ii are estimates of the means and
variances by operation and by year. There are no separate intercept terms in (3)
because the indicator variables sum to unity.
The formulation in (3) allows for both the mean and the variance processes
to vary by year and by operation. Furthermore, it is straightforward to conduct
hypothesis tests on the parameters of interest. However, in practical terms, (3)
may require a lot of data. With seven years of daily data and up to 15 observations
per day, the estimation involves up to 20,000 observations with parameters for
means and variances by year. Often, we specialize the estimation to examine one
particular year or one particular operation.
We use (3) in a number of different ways. We estimate variances on the days
when particular operations are initiated. We test whether variances during Fed
10operations are equal to variances on days with no operations. We also test whether
returns on days when there are draining operations are equal to returns on days
with adding operations.
Using indicator variables does not capture the effect of the magnitude of the
operation. However, the magnitude of the operation is problematic for a number
of reasons: the amount of reserves has grown through time, and more importantly,
we do not know how much of the operation is unexpected.
The first problem is reasonably easy to solve. By looking at the data by
year, we solve, to some extent, the problem of the size of the operations growing
through time. Alternatively, since we have data on total reserves, the operations
can be deflated by the total reserves to give a measure of relative size.
The last problem is more serious. Consider model (3). Variance might be high
during Fed Time on a nonoperation day because the market expected an operation.
The fact that no open market operation took place could be as important as an
open market operation taking place. What impacts volatility is the unexpected
component. In (3), we have combined both the unexpected and expected action.
Indeed, we have effectively assumed that the market always expects no operation.
Unfortunately, there are no data on expected open market operations.
4. Results
4.1.Interhour volatility
Table1 presents the hourly return variances and the heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors for fixed income instruments in Panels A to C and
for foreign currency contracts in Panels D to H. Panels A and B show distinct
intraday patterns in the money market futures data. Volatility is highest at the
open but declines until Fed Time hour when it elevates and declines thereafter.
From 1982 to 1988, the variance for the Treasury bifi futures in the hour before
Fed Time hour is 0.985. During the Fed Time hour, volatility more than doubles
to 2.062. Based on the standard errors, the increase in volatility is statistically
11significant. In fact, volatility increases from the preceding period to Fed Time
and decreases throughout the rest àf the day in every year during the sample
period. Similar results are found for the Eurodollar contract. For the full sample,
volatility more than doubles from 10:30—11:30 period to 11:30—12:30 hour [from
0.995 to 2.271]. In some years, the increase in volatility during Fed Time is even
more dramatic. Again, the volatility decreases after Fed Time in every year.
The opening hour return volatility is the highest of the day. This heightened
volatility has been traced to the concentration of economic news announcements
during this hour [Harvey and Huang (1991, 1993), Ederington and Lee (1993),
and Becker, Finnerty and Kopecky (1993)]. The intraday pattern also contrasts
with the pattern observed in equity markets. For example, Wood, Mclnish and
Ord (1983) documents a U-shaped intraday volatility pattern for the New York
Stock Exchange.
Treasury bond futures also exhibit a rise in interhour volatility during Fed
Time but the increase is much less dramatic. For example, from 1982 to 1988, it
increases from 43.629 during the preceding hour to 50.234 during the Fed Time
hour. In addition, the intraday pattern exhibits a W-shaped structure with an
elevation at Fed Time rather than an inverted U-shaped structure.
The impact of the Federal Reserve Bank's foreign exchange interventions on
the currency markets are well documented [see, for example, Kaminsky and Lewis
(1993)]. However, there is no study of the impact of open market operations on
currencies at the level of transactions data. Indeed, the close linkages between the
fixed income markets and the currency markets are well-known. Given these in-
terrelationships, the Federal Reserve Bank's open market operations that directly
involve fixed income instruments may also impact the U.S. dollar exchange rates.
However, the results in PaneLs D to H fail to reveal any elevation of hourly re-
turn volatility during Fed Time. Instead, the volatility in all the currency futures
markets appears to decline throughout the day starting with the opening bell.
124.2. Intrahour volatility
The preceding section presents estimates based on hourly prices. However, an
hourly return of zero may mask substantial fluctuation of prices during the hour.
In this section, we report variances of two-minute returns to capture intrahour
price movements. The results are reported in Table 2. The variances are calculated
over half-hour periods and the analysis is concentrated on the time interval 10:00—
12:00. The sample period for the two-minute results is October 6, 1982 to May
10, 1988 and, hence, 1982 and 1988 contain less than a full year of data.
Inferences based on the statistics in Table 2 are consistent with those based
on Table 1. In short, volatility increases during Fed Time for fixed income in-
struments. However, the increase for fixed income contracts is far more dramatic.
For Treasury bill futures, the volatility increases from 1.362 in the 11:00—11:30
interval to 35.248 during Fed Time in 1985. The variances follow similar patterns
for the Eurodollar contract. In 1985, the variance increases from 2.284 in the
11:00-11:30 half hour to 77.147 during Fed Time. The Treasury bond volatilities
are presented in the Panel C. In 1985, volatility increases from 27.297 to 274.900.
The year 1985 is also not an exceptional year for the increased volatility during
Fed Time. In almost every year for Treasury bill, Eurodollar, and Treasury bond
futures, volatility rises by more than an order of magnitude. The evidence for
currency futures does not reveal a rise in volatility during FedTime.
Table 2 also reports tests of the null hypothesis of equal variances between
the Fed Time and the three preceding half hours. Not surprisingly, the null of
variance equality is rejected in Panels A, B, and C. Also as expected, tests of
variance equality for the currency futures fail to reject the null with the notable
exception of the Canadian dollar futures contract.
4.3. Open market operations: returns and volatility
This section examines the impact of the specific open market operations.
Some summary statistics on the open market operations are presented in Table 3.
13Five operations are presented: MSPs, outright sales, outright purchases, system
RPs, and customer RPs. Data on foreign purchases and sales are also available
but are not included as they tend to be small and are unlikely to impact the
financial markets.
Table 3 also presents data on the average federal funds rate during the period,
the target federal funds rate and the standard deviation of the gap. Differences
in the rate and the target yield as well as the volatility of the gap may yield
information about the intensity of the open market operations. In addition, to
appreciate the magnitude of the operations, data on total reserves of the banking
sector are presented year by year.
The summary statistics show that the largest operation is the system RP av-
eraging $4.39 billion over the sample. There are 245 occurrences of this operation
from 1982—1988. Given that the average total reserves are $46.72 billion over the
sample, this specific operation represents almost 10% of the total reserves.
The MSP is the second largest operation averaging $2.52 billion followed by
the outright purchases at $1.99 billion. The customer repos are most frequently
used for a total of 458 occurrences with an average size of $1.69 billion. In the
sample, there are only three outright sales. As a result, we drop this open market
operation from further analysis.
The effect of the operations on the volatilities of two-minute returns during
Fed Time is reported in Table 4. The table shows average yearly volatilities on
days when specific operations are conducted, on days combining all the open
market operations, and on days without open market operations. A chi-square
test of the equality of variances between days with and without operations is also
provided. In contrast to (3), these estimates are obtained using data one year at
a time.
The first five rows of each panel in the table show the volatility and the
significance of specific operations by year. The results for Treasury bill, Eurodollar
and Treasury bond contracts show that there are swings in the precision of the
variance estimates by year and by operation. In contrast, the foreign currency
volatilities for individual operations are generally significant for the five exchange
14rates.
The last three rows of each panel in Table 4 compare volatilities between
days with and without operations. They reveal a striking pattern. With minor
exceptions, the volatility on days with open market operations is less than the
volatility on days without open market operations for all three fixed income in-
struments and five foreign currency contracts. When the exceptions do occur, a
formal test cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal volatility in every case. The
pattern is observed for every year in the sample. The results are more pronounced
for currency futures than for fixed income contracts in that the null of variance
equality is generally rejected.
While not reported in the table, multivariate tests which include all the years
were feasible for three contracts: Treasury bill, Eurodollar and the British pound.8
In the year by year univariate tests for the Treasury bill, volatility equality on
days with and without operations was rejected in two of the seven years. The
multivariate test rejects the null hypothesis of variance equality with a p-value
of 0.026. Similar results are obtained with the Eurodollar. For all the years
together, the equality of the Eurodollar variance on days with operations and on
nonoperation days is rejected at the 0.033 level. The results for the British pound
suggest that the null of equal variances can be rejected at the 0.001 level.
The evidence presented in Table 4 indicates that the increased volatility dur-
ing Fed Time is due not so much to the Federal Reserve Bank's open market
operations as to the absence of these operations! The mere fact that the Fed
designates a specific time slot for its trading desk operations is sufficient to gen-
erate ample uncertainty in the market place to increase volatility even when no
operations are being conducted. These results can be examined in terms of mar-
ket expectations. If the market expects daily open market operations but none
occur, the resulting surprise could lead to higher market volatility. Thus,market
volatility can be induced even if the Fed does not enter the market. On days
that the Federal Reserve Bank accommodates the market expectations by con-
8Thesize of the data matrix was too large for estimation on an IBM 4341. for
the other contracts.
15ducting reserve-draining or adding operations, surprises and market volatility are
mitigated. Indeed, the lack of significance for specific open market operations in
Table 4 may be interpreted as cases when market expectations are met on average.
In implementing its open market operations, the Federal Reserve Bank also
tries to minimize any disruption to the market place. For example, Meulendyke
(1988) notes that:
"Desk officers also take market conditions into account in choos-
ing the day to arrange an outright operation. They try to avoid
conducting operations in rapidly rising or falling markets, not
wishing either to add to market volatility or to impede price
adjustment."
To the extent that market volatility during Fed Time on days with operations
is no higher than on days without operation, the Fed appears to have succeeded
in decreasing the impact of market operations. However, it is interesting to note
again that the stipulation of a Fed Time has already elevated market volatility
above the adjacent time periods.
Table 5 further classifies open market operations into reserve-draining and
reserve-adding operations and examines their impact on returns and volatilities
during Fed Time.9 For this analysis, all days with both reserve-adding and reserve-
draining operations are thrown out. Outright sales and MSPs drain reserves and
should increase interest rates, reducing prices and producing negative returns.
Outright purchases and system RPs add to reserves and should increase market
prices. Customer RPs also add to reserves but given that they are smaller than
the system RPs and viewed as more temporary by market participants, we ex-
clude them from the addition category. However, these predictions may fail to
materialize if the market participants are able to predict the type of open market
operation the Fed plans to conduct.
The results show that for both fixed income and currency futures contracts,
The results for the impact of individual operations on returns are available
from the authors on request.
16the estimated returns often have the wrong signs. For example, negative returns
are observed for every year in the sample for Treasury bonds for reserve-adding
operations contrary to prediction. More interestingly, Table 5 also reports tests of
return equality for reserve-adding and reserve-draining operations. For every fi-
nancial market that we examine, the test results show that the impact on returns of
reserve-adding operations cannot be distinguished reliably from reserve-draining
operations. Multivariate tests of whether the year-by-year means are the same
for draining and adding operations combining all seven years of data also fail to
reject the null hypothesis for all contracts. Thus, it appears that over our sam-
ple period, open market operations do not have the predicted impact on market
returns. These results suggest that when open market operations are conducted,
their purposes are well anticipated by the market place. In effect, the market
participants are able to predict the type of intervention the Federal Reserve Bank
intends to apply.
A similar analysis is conducted for volatilities in Table 5. In particular, year-
by-year tests of variance equality generally do not reject the null hypothesis of
equal volatility for fixed income instruments. For both Treasury bill and Eu-
rodollar contracts, market volatility when reserves are added is greater than the
volatility when reserves are drained for five of seven years but are only signif-
icantly different at the 10% level in two of these years. A multivariate test of
variance equality across all the years jointly rejects the hypothesis that the vari-
ances are the same at the 5% level of significance for Eurodollar futures. However,
for Treasury bill futures, the multivariate test fails to reject the null hypothesis of
equal variance. For Treasury bonds, adding volatility is significantly greater than
draining volatility in 1986, but the multivariate test fails to reject the hypothesis
of equal volatility with a p-value of 0.12.
The results for currency futures are different. For the years 1983 to 1987,
reserve-adding volatilities significantly exceed reserve-draining volatilities in al-
most all cases. The variances for 1982 and 1988 with less than full year's data are
insignificantly different between the two types of operations. For all the years, the
multivariate tests easily reject the null hypothesis of equal variances at the 0.001
17level of significance.
The evidence in Table 5 is consistent with market participants correctly fore-
casting the purpose of open market operations. This would account for the in-
ability of our tests to distinguish the impact on the financial contract's returns
of reserve-adding versus reserve-draining operations. However, there appears to
be an asymmetric effect on volatility. It is possible that adding operations signal
some fundamental information about weakness in the economy which translates
into market volatility.
When the evidence in Table 5 is examined in conjunction with the results in
Table 4, it provides an explanation for the lower volatility observed during Fed
Time when open market operations occur. In particular, the ability to forecast the
type of open market operations may account for the somewhat surprising finding
that volatility is lower in Fed Time when the Fed does trade. If the market can
forecast direction but not timing, the days with no operations may experience the
highest forecast errors. These forecasts errors could induce volatility as market
participants readjust their portfolios to incorporate the information revealed in
the Fed's decision not to trade.
5. Conclusions
The Federal Reserve Bank is a unique trader whose actions reveal information
about monetary policy. The trading is concentrated during the half hour known
as Fed Time. We find that market volatility is dramatically higher during this half
hour than surrounding times. However, this increased volatility is independent of
whether the Fed actually trades in the market. In fact, volatility is lower during
Fed Time when the Fed trades than when it does not trade.
We also examine how the market differentiates between reserve-adding and
reserve-draining operations by the Federal Reserve Bank. Reserve-adding volatil-
ity appears to be higher than reserve-draining volatility for both fixed income and
currency futures. More startling is the result that the effects on futures returns of
reserve-draining and reserve-adding operations are statistically indistinguishable
from one another.
18Our results suggest that from 1982 to 1988, the financial markets are able
to anticipate the type of open market operations the Federal Reserve Bank uses,
but are unable to forecast correctly when the open market operations occur. This
accounts for the lower volatility observed during Fed Time when the Fed conducts
open market operations. However, financial markets unsuccessfully forecast the
timing of open market operations. This accounts for the increase in volatility
during Fed Time.
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where rtisthe vector ofreturns oversix hourlyLimeintervals, .sIs thevector ofmeanestimates,a2 isthe vectorof variance
estimates, and u is the vector of the disturbances with unconditional sero means. The system Is exactly identified. Parameters
are obtained by estimating both year by year and by a pooled estimation using the full sample. The data are from January 2,
1982—May 10, 1988.
Fed Tim.
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The vtancus are I.hose of ib. rslativ. price changes cniculMsd a, (Th/pt—i) —1 md at. niuItipli.d by 10,000,000. Tb. osarby Contract is used until two
wseko before sxplretion when we switch Ic th, O.xt-out contceot. Beginning Octobet 11, 1984 the Ibemsuzy bill opening was moved back (toni 5:00 CT to
7:30 CT. On October 15, 1985, both the Eurodollar and Treasury bill openings wet. moved back to 7:20 CT. Tb. vananc.s (or lb. EwodoUu,Treasury
bill and Treasury bond are estimated without the October 20. 1987 obssrvst.oc. Standard strom In parentheses are b.Ierosksdasticity 000e.st,nI.Table 2
Intrabour volatility near Fed Time in financial markets
The model estimatedis: =—p
22 (2) —
where ?j is a 1 x 4 vector of 2-minute returns at time t over the four half-hour intervals, p are the means, o' alethe variances, and
u,, e are the disturbances. This system is exactlyIdentifiedand Ii estima*es by year. The hypothesis that the variance during
Fed time is equal to the variance during one of the other half-hour periods ii conducted with a Wald test. The sample is October
6, 1982 to May 10,1988.
(72
Veer 10-10:30 10:30-it 11-1130 11:30-13 Fud Tim. a= Fed Tim. 0.2=F.d Tim. a=
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Tb, variances are thee, at the relative pnc. changescalcula&.d a.(n(ptIp-i)sadare multiplied by 10,000,000. The nearbycontractis a.ed until L.a
weekibetore.xpiraicawhen we switch to the uext-out contract.Standard.rror, in pereathes. are b.t.raekadaeticity consistent.Table 3































































































8.13 8.05 0.520 46.72
Date b.gina ou October 6, 1982 when the Federal Reserve swilcb.d it. op.reLin polici.. free. oe.y supply targeting to borrowed r...r.'ee/t..d funda
ret. tazgsting.Table 4
The effect of open market operations on volatility based on 2 minute return., during Fed Time
The model estimated is:
55FT,I = TFT, —( E E,j1'J°)
y59U21.1
= —( E vI'j°)
—192 j—1
where j represents the type of operation (outright purchase, outright sale, matched-sale puchase, system repo, customer repo, and
no operation), y represents the year, 10M0 Is an indicator variable for the open market operations. In this formulation, r7- is
a 15 x 1 vector of two minute returns in Fed Time for time period t. up and 6p7'g are the distuibance termi a.uociated with
the mean and variance equations. The parameter. p and varee.tiznate. of the means and variance. by operation and by year.
There is no intercept because the intercepts sum to unity. The system is exactly Identified. For moat of the results, the system ii
estimated year by year. For the test of whether the variance is different on days with operations versus days without operations.
the system is estimated with two mean and two variance parameters. A Wald test Is conducted on the variance parameters. The
sample is October 6, 1982 to May 10, 1988.
Opimurket I I I I






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The variances arethoseo( the relativ, price change. calculated am 1n(p/p._1) and a,.multiplied by10,000,000. Tb. nearby contract is used until two
weelu before expiration when we switch to the next-out contract. Standard snore in parsntbee.e ace hetero.kadasticity consistent.TabLe 5
The effect of reserve adding and draining operations on returns and volatility
The model estimated is:





where irepresentsthe purpose of the operation: Addition (outright purchase, system repo); Drain (outright sale, matched sale-
purchase); No action. Customer repos are also an addition operation, however, they are lees likely to be viewed as linked to policy
and we do not include them in the addition category. y represents the year and the indicator I,tow takes on a value ofoneduring
year y and for operation purpose i. In this formulation, r' is up to a 15 x 1 vector of two minute returnS in FedTime for time
period t. w,T,,andep- are the disturbance terms associated with the mean and variance equations. The parameters p and e
are estimates of the mean., and variances by purpose of operation and by year. There Is no intercept because the intercepts sum
tounity. The system is eractly identified. For most of the results, the system Is estimated year by year. A Weld test Is conducted
to test the equality of variances and means. The parameters for days with no operations are not reported. If there Is a day with
both an adding and draining operation, the day is omitted from the sample. The sample is October 6, 1982 to May 10, 1988.
Op... nwk.1 Muitivariat.
ep.rstion 1982 1983 1984 1985 1968 1987 1988
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Tb. vanaocee are thorn. ot the relativepricechances c.lculatsd a. £n(pu/p_1) and are multiplied by 10.000,000. The .&rby contract 1. u.ed until Iwo
w.eka before expiration when we switch to lb. u.xt-Outcontract. ThemuhtavariaSs variance .quality 14Mm are conductsd by satimatrm the .y.tem of
equation. (orthemanna and vanance acme. all ywe and restricting Oh. varianc. parameters for draining and a44in op.rations to be .qual in each year.
There are .sv.n overidentilying conditions. Tb. multivu'iat. return. equality terms are cooductad by uutimatini only th.mean.quationsscro.. iii years
and restricting the mean, (or draining and adding op.mMiom to be .qu.al In seth year. There are sven ovsridentWing coe4itioos. Standard error' in
paruothereaare h.tero.k.da.ticity con,iatuot.